Endmatter

Footnotes

¹This remark is perhaps to be understood of the parable of the workers in the vineyard, some of whom work the whole day, some lesser parts of the day according as they began at different hours. So true faith is to believe all the articles revealed at the time and in the condition anyone then finds himself in; and so some can have true faith if they believe fewer articles and others only if they believe more.

²This section is an extensive and somewhat fractured addition by Scotus to the basic text.

³No reply to the third argument [n.4] is given by Scotus, but it is in effect responded to in the quotation from Bonaventure in the next footnote.

⁴The Vatican Editors refer to Bonaventure Sent. 3 d.30 a.1 q.4 ad 3. “To the objection that loving one’s enemies is something marvelous, one must say that ‘marvelous’ means something that is above the power of nature. But this can be taken in two ways, as to the operations of nature simply or as to the operations of rational nature. Now to do marvels beyond the power of nature simply...is not given to everyone, while to do marvels beyond the power of rational nature comes [to everyone] through sanctifying grace, namely through faith and charity. For by faith we believe many things that we could not believe without faith and that seem to infidels to be extremely incredible; and by charity we love things that seem hateful to those who lack charity. And these marvels are contained in the divine law, and to do them is given to everyone who wants to receive sanctifying grace. And so one cannot argue that we are not bound to love our enemies; for this belongs to a different kind of marvel than what Augustine is talking about.”

⁵Scotus takes Aquinas’ opinion from numerous of Aquinas’ writings (and also from summaries by Henry of Ghent), including Aquinas’ Commentary on the Sentences, the Summa Theologica, and Commentary on the Ethics.

⁶The fourth reason [n.14] is not brought round to the opposite here, but it is dealt with at large below in nn.46-47, 49-56.

⁷This argument is not found in the Ordinatio but in the Lectura d.33 n.6 (a peculiarity found elsewhere in the Ordinatio).

⁸According to the Vatican editors, some mss. contain these further remarks canceled by Scotus in an appended note. “...the three theological virtues, the wayfarer is sufficiently perfected [by them] immediately with respect to God. For concerning God as he is to be understood in this life, faith sufficiently perfects the wayfarer, because only the knowledge of faith can be had about God in this life (as was said in Lectura III d.23 n.19); concerning God as he is lovable in himself, charity sufficiently perfects the wayfarer, and concerning God as he is desirable and advantageous for me, hope sufficiently perfects the wayfarer (as is clear from the articles above about hope and charity, d.26 nn.89-96, d.27 nn.29-32). But it is not possible for the wayfarer to have any other ordered acts about God save understanding and loving him as he is in himself, and desiring him for myself as he is my good;     therefore etc   .

Likewise, about every good (as about an object) other than God, the wayfarer is sufficiently perfected when he is perfected about them by the intellectual and the appetitive habits. But these intellectual habits, which sufficiently perfect the intellect, are the intellectual virtues, for the intellectual virtues do sufficiently perfect the wayfarer, as far as possible, for considering things and for practical syllogizing. The appetitive habits too are the appetitive virtues, which appetitive virtues sufficiently perfect the wayfarer for desiring or loving everything lovable, whether in its order to himself or in its order to another.”

⁹Augustine Against Faustus 22 ch.27, “Eternal law is divine reason or the will of God bidding one to keep the natural order and forbidding one to disturb it.” 83 Questions q.53 n.2, “From this ineffable and sublime administration of things, which is done through divine providence, a natural law is as it were written in the rational soul.”

¹⁰Adopting the reading from Q ‘impertinenti’ and not the ‘in particulari’ of the Vatican editors.

¹¹This criticism does not apply to Aquinas’ way of understanding the object of an act of lying, since for him the object includes the intention to say other than what one thinks. Scotus seems to hold, nn.20-21, that this way of understanding the object of an act conflates two different things.

¹²Augustine speaks of local variations as approved by particular churches which may be freely observed provided they are not against faith or morals, or are not obstinately insisted on or opposed.

¹³Gratian’s Decrees have been replaced by the Church’s Code of Canon Law, which incorporates some of those decrees and adapts and replaces them relative to the needs of the time. Scotus is here essentially supporting and endorsing the Church’s power and authority to regulate the life of the faithful according to the needs of faith and morals.